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The great body of work in the area of forecasting has been concerned with 
derivations of forecasts and not with their effect on decisionmaking. Nelson [I] 
is the first, to my knowledge, to ascertain the value of forecasting in decision- 
making, his central point being that a forecast is only a signal and, with 
each such signal, there will be an associated error of actual outcome. He 
actually goes further to consider the choice of appropriate forecast, but we 
shall assume that the forecasting procedure is given and will be concerned 
with the use of these forecasts bearing in mind the associated probability 
distribution of errors. 
Nelson mentions sequential problems but restrict his treatment to single 
action type situations or, if serial type, independent situations without 
discounting. We shall consider serial type problems with interdependence, 
with and without discounting, and will follow Bellman [2], in which paper 
he considers the problem of a faulty communication channel which can easily 
be paraphrased into the forecasting problem. 
Forecasting is only one of the many realizations of the process of providing 
information. It is assumed, in many instances, that provision of information 
can never be detrimental to decisionmaking, but, as we shall see in this 
article, and as may then be reinterpreted in other situations, there are certain 
reasonable instances in which this is not so. We shall effectively be dealing 
with the case in which there is an open choice as to whether values of a 
particular parameter (in this case the forecasting parameter) should or 
should not be made known to decisionmaker. As a consequence of this 
we are led on naturally to reconsider the concepts of “better information” 
and “better decisionmaking” and this we shall leave for a future exposition. 
Itwill appear that the use of a discounting factor can complicate the situation. 
To provide a specific instance of the application of the following theory 
we will extend Bellman’s [3] inventory control model to include the fore- 
casting factor. 
A brief discussion of the relevant aspects of Nelson’s theory will be required 
and this will be our first task. 
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This problem is completely described b\ 
(i) a set of alternative acts, i/z;., k = 1, 2, ... nf, 
(ii) a set of outcomes, ( j), j : I, 2, ... II, 
(iii) a set of forecasts, {i}, i = 1, 2, ... n, 
(iv) three probability distributions, viz. 
(a) the probability, qi , that for any unit time period a forecast i will be 
made, and assumed to be independent of previous events, 
(b) the probability, Pj , that for any unit time period the realized out- 
come will be j and assumed to be independent of previous demands, 
(c) the probability, Pij , that if forecast i is made the realized outcome 
will be j, 
(v) a return function, r( j, k), if act R is taken and outcome j is realized, 
(vi) an objective criterion, which is to maximize the expected return 
for each unit time period individually. 
If we use the forecast as the basis of our choice, and if e(i) is the maximum 
expected return based on forecast i, we see that 
e(i) = rntx [z Pijr(j, k)] = m;x [e(i, k)], 
i 
where e(i, K) is suitably defined. 
If we do without the forecast and if e is the maximum expected return on 
this basis, 
e = max 
k 
[F PA i k,] . (2) 
Nelson then defines the value of the forecasts as the difference between 
the expected returns, taken over all forecasts, using the forecasting procedure, 
and the expected return not using the forecasts, viz. 
7~ = 2 qie(i) - e. 
It is easily seen (see Appendix) that v 2 0. 
Thus the forecast is better, from a decisionmaking point of view, only when 
averaged over all possible conditions. It is not better, necessarily, for an 
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isolated situation in which i is given. Thus consider a problem defined as 
follows (taken partially from Nelson) 
Y( 1, 1) = Y(2, 1) = - 200, Y(1) 2) = - 2000, Y(2,2) = 0, 
q1 = 0.18, q2 = 0.82, P, = 0.09, P, = 0.91, 
7 
p,,=ijj, 12 18’ p =II. P,, = $ ) 
Then 
e=-min &jx200+~ox200,~x2~]= [ 
e(1) = - min [ 
200,200O x j$ = - 200, 
e(2) = - min [ 
200,200O x $1 = - 49, 
zq$(i) = -lg X 200 -lg x 7 = - 76 > e. 
t 
180, (4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Hence the expected value, conditional on the first forecast being made, 
is less than the expected value conditional on no forecast. Of course, if the 
situation is a serial one, but with no discounting, it is true that the expected 
return, taken over all future contingencies, is maximized using the forecast, 
but, as we shall see later, the discount factor can create havoc with this 
point of savior, as will the possibility that the duration of the situation may 
short. 
2. AN EXTENSION OF NELSON’S APPROACH 
Let us define: 
(i) u to be the state vaniable describing the condition of the system 
at the beginning of any period, excluding forecast information, 
(ii) w to be the transform of u, 
(iii) Y~(u, V) to be the return in the next period of time if we begin in 
state u, transform to state v, having taken action K, 
(iv) Pit to be the transition probability from u to w when forcast i is 
made and action k is taken, 
(v) Ptv to be the transition probability from u to v, neglecting fore- 
casts, and action k is taken, 
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(vi) qi to be the probability of forecast i. 
(vii) a to be the discount factor, 
(viii) fn(u, i) to be the expected discounted return over the next n periods 
of time, beginning in state u with forecast i. using an optimal policy, and 
using the forecasts each time, 
(ix) fn(u) to be the expected discounted return over the next rz periods 
of time beginning in state N, using an optimal policy and having no forecasts 
available. 
We then derive 
(8) 
P:,Y”(u, v) + a 2 P:.LJ-,(v)] . 
P ,’ 
For a < 1, the limiting forms are (see Howard [4]) 
(9) 
(11) 
When 01 = 1, assuming complete ergodicity, and restricting ourselves to 
stationary policies, the corresponding equations become, using asterisks to 
denote the different part played by thef’s, 
f*(u, i) + g = my [C PF(u, 4 + 2 z &%7jf *cv,n] , (12) 
L’ u j 
f*(u) + 2 = my [z P&,Y”(U, v) + 2 Ptvf *(v)] . 
u L 
(13) 
As in Section 1 it is possible to havef(u, ;) <f(u) for some values of u, i. 
If we now average over all possible forecasts, i, and define 
F(u) = z 4if (4 9, (14) 
I 
then Eq. (10) becomes 
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It can easily be shown (see Appendix) that F(u) >f(~), and hence, when 
averaged over all forecasts, the policy derived from Eq. (10) is at least as 
good as the policy derived from Eq. (Ii), although for some particular 
values of U, i, this may not be so. As we shall now show, when iy = 1, pro- 
viding the system operates long enough, the average gain per unit time, taken 
over all forecasts, cannot be reduced using the forecasts, and any transient 
loss, because f*(~, i) <f*(u) for some u, i, does not matter. But when 
a < 1 (an extreme case would be when (Y = 0) the forecasting procedure 
can reduce the expected returns. 
To return to the case when OL = 1, it is easily seen (see the Appendix) that 
g 3 g” and the forecasting procedure has definite value in the long run. 
Let us now return to Bellman’s [3] inventory problem. We shall use the 
continuous formulation to begin with since it allows some properties of the 
solution to be identified and then use the discrete approximation to get a 
solution. 
3. INVENTORY CONTROL AND FORECASTING 
Following Bellman we define 
(i) K to be the cost of providing one unit of commodity, 
(ii) P to be the penalty cost per unit shortage, 
(iii) 01 to be the discount factor, 
(iv) 4(t) to be the probabilit y d ensity function for forecasts, t, assumed 
to be independently and identically distributed from period to period, 
(v) $(s, t) to be the probability density function for demand, S, when t 
is forecast, 
(vi) fn(x, t) to be th e expected discounted cost over the next n periods 
of time beginning with stock level, x, and forecast, t, using an optimal policy. 
We then have 
This becomes, with the appropriate definition of B&y, t), 
f&, 2) = - I& + g [t&J, q1. 
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We can, but will not, for the purpose of shortening the paper, prove the 
following. Let 01 < 1. Then 
(4 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(4 
f 65 4 
fi(x, t) is convex in x, 
B1(y, t) is convex in y, 
fn(x, t) is convex in x for all n, 
8,(y, t) is convex in y for all n, 
{fn(x, t)} converges uniformly to a function f(x, t) satisfying 
+kx=~:[kY+crPj~>~d(s,t)(s-Y)ds 
/ 
+ ci s,j,$<, 4h 4 d@)f (Y 
(4 f(x, t) and W,.Y, t) are both convex in y. 
The solution to the problem is then 
y = max [x, x(01, 
where x(t) is the unique solution of 
s, u) ds du 
I 
. (17) 
(18) 
O=k-02’1 
s>%?(t) 9(s9 t, ds + a U.s,d,, 
+(s, t) 4(u) g (x(t) - s, u) ds du. 
/ 
(19) 
Now let 
F(x) = j f (x, t) 4(t) dt. 
t 
cw 
Then Eq. (17) (when integrated over t) and (19) become 
F(x) + h = j, 4(t) y& WY, 4 dt, (21) 
k--orp j s>z(t) +(s, t) dt + 01 j,,,,,, $(s, t)Wx(t) - s)ds = 0. (22) 
/ 
(We do not intend to enter into the finesses of mathematical arguments 
needed for differentiation under the integral signs, or anywhere else, since 
this would confuse the issue and no real difficulties are anticipated anyway.) 
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Now let g = inf, [x(i)]. Then, again quite formally, from Eq. (21), we 
get, if x < Ir 
F’(x) = - k. (23) 
Thus 8 satisfies, for some t, the counterpart of Bellman’s critical order 
quantity equation, viz. 
(24) 
Now from Eq. (21), plus the convexity of 8, we see that F’(x) 3 - K. 
Hence if i(t) is the general solution of Eq. (24) we have, assuming ~rp > K 
(as per Bellman) 
x(t) < i(t). (25) 
Hence j: < inf, [i(t)]. But 3 = G(t) for some t, and, therefore, 
g = iyf [k(t)]. (26) 
If f = supt [x(t)], we obviously have 
2 < silp [i(t)]. (27) 
x and f, given by Eqs. (26) and (27), can be used to some advantage when 
valid, but the ability to compute a solution in no way depends on these 
results. Let us now turn to an approximating computational routine. The 
equations we wish to solve are (22) and the following derived from (21) 
(again formally) 
where 
a+, t) - = k - orp j- ax $(s, t) ds + OL 1 +(s, t)F’(x - s) ds. s>z S$X (29) 
Before we go over to this, corresponding results can be formally derived 
for the case when LX = 1, and the solution is, formally, obtained simply by 
putting 01 = 1 in the corresponding equations above. The counterpart of 
Eq. (21), for example, would be 
F*(x) + Ax + g = j)(t) y$~ P*(y, t)] dt, 
where g is the cost per unit time using the forecasts. 
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4. APPROXI~NTING C’ontPuT.\TIoNAL ROUTINE 
Let us now consider the discrete approsimations to Eqs. (22) and (29). 
Let .Y = 18, t = m6, s = 126, 1, M, N = 0. I, 2, ... . Let, also, F’(s) = a, and 
xt = r(m)& The discrete equations then become 
where qm , qnm are the discrete counterparts of 4(t) and $(s, t), viz. 
r 
(mzfl)S 
4(f) dt = q& * li,6 (32) 
s 
(n+1)8 
qS(s, t) ds = qnmS. 
IL8 (33) 
Let us suppose, now, that 3 has been calculated from Eq. (26) or, failing 
this, begin with x = 0 (F > 0). Let the greatest lower bound of E for which 
x - IS > 0 be 1, and hence, as a first approximation, we have, 
zl = - k, for I < 1. (34) 
With 2 = 1 + 1, Eq. (30) b ecomes, since no m exists for which r(m) < 1, 
Since we know a, , z,-~ , ..* z. , we can compute .zlfl from Eq. (35) once 
we know {m : t(m) = 1). This reduces to finding all m such that the following 
equation holds approximately, viz. 
(36) 
The required set of {m} would likely be chosen by allowing the L.H.S. to 
vary within the region 0 & ek wher E is small. 
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Now let us consider the general case and let us suppose that {zI} have been 
computed, 2 < IV, for some IV. Also let the values of m for which r(m) < :\- 
have been found. We then have, for I = N + 1, 
‘N+1 
(37) 
We can thus compute zNfl once we have found all m such that r(m) < I\-. 
By hypothesis we already have all m such that y(m) < N. Hence we only 
need all m such that y(m) = N. These will be found from the approximate 
solution (i.e., within Ek of 0) to 
The procedure will be repeated until r(m) has been found for all values of m 
required to cover the forecasting range. The solution will then be: “order up 
to r(m) 6 if the stock level is 16 < r(m) 6 and the forecast is mS; otherwise 
do not order anything.” 
The case 01 = 1 has not been treated, although, it might be expected that 
the action solution would be the limiting action solution as cx tends to 1. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The essential conclusion is that information can reduce the expected 
returns either for short duration processes or for processes with a sufficiently 
low discounting factor; and that, therefore, the generally accepted view that 
added information means better decisionmaking needs to be clearly examined, 
at least if “expected values” are to be taken as the motivating criterion. 
The use of forecasting in inventory control produces an interesting 
generalization of one of Bellman’s problems in which the optimum decision 
rule is seen to be a simple modification of his rule obtained without consider- 
ing forecasts. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Proof that 7’ >, 0 in Eq. (3) 
=z qi m;x [e(i, k)] - m;s [C; 2 C7ipijy(.i, k)] 
i i 
=z qi mfx [e(i, k)] - mtx [F Wfi, k)] 
> mk= [x w(i, k)] - m,y [F w(i, k,] 
I 
z 0. 
B. Proof that F(u) > f(u) (Eqs. (11) and (22)) 
f(u) = rntx [Z eJk(U, 4 + aJ x pm] 
t, ‘C 
NOW define d(F,f) = min, [F(s) -f(s)], Then 4Fjf) 3 d(cf) and 
hence d(F,f) > 0 (a < 1). 
C. Proof that g > 2 (Eqs. (12) and (13)) 
Define F*(u) = Y& qi f *(u, i). Then Eq. (12) becomes 
F*(U) + g = 2 qi mfx [z: P:‘“,Y”(u, w) + 2 P3’(v)] . 
1 1’ I! 
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Hence, as with case (C) we get a similar result, viz. 
where y(u) > 0 and K = k(u) is the optimal policy without forecasts. 
If T, are the limiting steady state probabilities for II (assuming complete 
ergodicity, but even this is not necessary, but avoids complicating the proof) 
we obtain 
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